People’s war – psychological warfare

World War II was often called the 'people's war'. One of the BBC's preferred ways of contributing to the war effort was to represent the concerns of the people and put them in a wider context. Listeners' responses to the BBC's wartime broadcasting not only enabled ordinary people's concerns, hopes, fears and aspirations to be voiced publicly, but they were also heard by the British government, thus influencing the subsequent evolution of propaganda policy. In contrast, RN and Radio Paris were more concerned with projecting legitimacy and disseminating information using the voices of authorities and ordinary people. In so doing, they actively sought the participation of the public and constructed their preferred realities through the responses and voices of these participants.

Before turning to the narratives of the different radio stations it is necessary to reflect on the role of radio in psychological warfare and propaganda. The study of propaganda in occupied France and Vichy as conveyed in the narratives of the broadcasts is the main focus of this book. 'Propaganda' as a term had historically been associated with lies and falsehood, and this was particularly prevalent during the Great War of 1914–18.29 Contemporary propaganda in the more technologically advanced society of the 1930s, however, was not just about lies and falsehood. Instead, it could encompass many levels of truth.

During World War II, both the Germans and the British recognised that lying must be avoided and facts must be accurate in their messages to the public. Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda, wanted the communiqués of the Wehrmacht to be as accurate as possible. There is, however, a distinction between the facts – which must stay true – and the intention and interpretation of the moral elements of those facts, which could be manipulated to serve the political purpose of the propagandists. This distinction is key to understanding propaganda and the role played by the three radio stations.

The European Services of the BBC enjoyed a reputation of truthfulness among its listeners. The BBC report of 21 February 1941 cited evidence originating from Northern France praising the BBC, saying that 'we hear the voice of truth, our France – you are "the voice of the Frank".' Similar evidence was cited in subsequent reports that the French listeners had great faith in the veracity of the BBC. However, it is the interpretation of 'true facts' that reveals the political aim of the radio propagandists. As established in the report of 8 July 1940, the future role of the BBC lay in keeping the French on the British side, giving something more than 'straight news' if the BBC wanted to be an effective weapon.

For example, when the British bombed Paris and its suburbs in 1942, all three radio stations reported this fact, which was true. However, it was the intention and interpretation of this fact that marked the difference in the narratives of their broadcasts, which served different propaganda aims and political purposes: while the BBC interpreted the event as a necessity for the greater good, Radio Paris interpreted it as a murderous act, causing unnecessary suffering and loss of civilian life, whereas RN started reporting on it in a matter-of-fact manner, in an attempt to preserve the station's perceived 'neutrality', although this stance soon changed as the war progressed.

In terms of the effects of propaganda and how far it serves the purpose of changing attitudes and ideas, it is more limited than is widely believed. Instead, propaganda plays a more prominent role in reinforcing, sharpening and focusing existing trends and beliefs. Propaganda needs to appeal to the rational element in humans as 'attitudes and behaviour are also the products of rational decisions', and should be viewed as an integral part of the whole political process. There is also an argument that propaganda should be viewed as a sociological phenomenon 'rather than as something made by certain people for certain purposes'. Propaganda can be categorised into 'propaganda of agitation', which is subversive propaganda, and 'propaganda of integration', which is often more subtle and complex and aims at stabilising and unifying society. These two types of propaganda could both be observed in all the narratives of the three radio stations to a varied extent.

The effects of propaganda cannot really be measured using experiments involving small groups, nor can they be replicated in a test tube. This is because propaganda, especially that of wartime, is a unique phenomenon that results from 'the totality of forces pressing in upon an individual in his society'. Therefore, this book aims to present and evaluate the narratives of each radio station in the context of the totality of forces imposed on the French during the period of occupation.

Propaganda has its limitations, of course. For example, it relies on pre-existing attitudes, which can only be modified very slowly; it cannot reverse or change the central psychological or sociological trends in that society; and it must be compatible with facts or at least appear to be compatible with facts, rather than being solely based on ideas. Goebbels cleverly shifted his propaganda focus to the heroism of the German soldiers when reporting the battle of Stalingrad, rather than emphasising military merits, because it was a major military defeat. Moreover, the psychological effect of propaganda is largely time-bound: 'the psychological action must be lasting and continuous'. Propaganda directed at foreign countries is inevitably much less effective because of the propagandist's psychological ignorance of the attitudes, interests and beliefs of their target audience, who in return commonly display a spontaneous suspicion of anything that comes from the outside.

For these reasons, the BBC was facing an uphill battle from the outset: the broadcasts came from outside of France and were therefore subject to this additional limitation. The BBC attempted to address this by using mainly French speakers and tapping into the practical concerns of the public, making far greater efforts to collect intelligence and monitor public opinion than did RN or Radio Paris. In contrast, RN and Radio Paris were both broadcasting from within France and claimed to represent the voice of France, albeit somewhat controversially, especially in the case of Radio Paris.

Radio propaganda played a crucial role in the execution of the psychological warfare targeted at the French during this period. This is because radio has a number of unique advantages. One of these is immediacy, which meant the listeners could be made believe that they were participating in and bearing witness to events of great importance. For example, appeals for food and clothing via radio broadcasting could be shown to be very successful in helping people who had lost their homes after the bombing of Paris.

By July 1940, the BBC had come to realise that radio broadcasting was their only means of rapidly and effectively addressing France and most of the rest of Europe. It had several advantages over other conventional methods of communication. Leaflet-dropping by air, for example, was not considered cost-effective due to factors such as the weight of the paper to be dropped, the number of sorties and aircraft needed for the operation, the navigation skills that were required to drop the leaflets accurately, the experience of the aircrew, the possibility of adverse weather, the fuel cost, the wear and tear of the aircraft and the risks for the crew members.

RN was the flagship radio station of the Vichy administration, whose first priority was to seek legitimation. As soon as the Armistice was signed on 22 June 1940, RN started to act as the voice of Vichy authority. The latter had the difficult task of presenting itself as an independent French State in the context of limited political sovereignty, a controlled environment and restricted freedom as imposed by the German authorities. The very nature of Vichy meant that it depended on radio as one of its main propaganda tools. Pétain's heavy involvement with RN meant that he was able to establish a personal relationship with the public and impose his political vision on the audience. 'Travail, Famille, Patrie' became the tripartite motto used by its radio propaganda to convince the French of the superiority of the new moral order and the movement of National Revolution, which sought the revival and reconstruction of France and to revert to its days of glory.

Goebbels, the mastermind of the Nazi propaganda machine, also saw radio as an effective means to persuade those who had already been partially converted to the German cause. He maintained that to be successful, the propagandist must know the individuals and their social groups well and possess the ability to unite people for the National Socialist movement:

The propagandist must understand not only how to speak to the people in their totality but also to individual sections of the population: to the worker, the peasant, the middle class … he must be able to speak to different professions and to different faiths. The propagandist must always be in a position to speak to people in the language that they understand. These capacities are the essential preconditions for success.

Goebbels's aim was reflected in both the organisation of Radio Paris and its choice of speakers. Radio Paris presented itself as a French radio, using mainly French speakers with a variety of good-quality programmes to keep its listeners tuned in. Radio Paris was a German managed station in terms of its organisation and control but was disguised as a voice for the French. There was a good balance between its propaganda message, news services, entertainment, and cultural programmes. Radio Paris would have had more success in making the French believe in the new ideology of Collaboration and the concept of New Europe if only Hitler's policy towards France had been different. For the ideology of Collaboration and of a united Europe to have the slightest chance of succeeding, the Germans would have to stop crushing France under their boots, which they never stopped doing during the war years. If it transpires that radio propaganda reflects the policy of the enemy or a policy of hypocrisy, its credibility vanishes – Hitler's mistake was the revenge he inflicted upon the French which people then had to live through.

- Winning French Minds: Radio Propaganda in Occupied France, 1940–42 is published by Casemate, priced at £39.95. You can get a 25% discount using the code Psychmag23.